IRAQI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES: A CASE STUDY TO EXAMINE
THEIR LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS WHEN THE UNITED STATES
AND COALITION FORCES DEPART

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14. ABSTRACT
An examination of ethnic demography, historical governments, political parties, force structure, organization, and partnership efforts within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior includes several recommendations that must be accomplished in order to provide permanent security and stability to the nation. These variables must be considered and delicately balanced as the United States and its coalition partners assist the nation of Iraq in its democratization. This thesis examines the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, focusing on the Iraqi Police Services, and the ongoing efforts to provide internal security to the nation without regard to ethnicity, religious beliefs, or political ties. Instead, the reformation of this organization requires an increased national capacity and capability within the Ministry of Interior to sufficiently recruit, vet, and develop an adequate force structure to secure the nation during an extremely complex insurgency. The thesis also identifies the need to develop an organization responsible for nation's internal security that unifies ethnic factions that will protect and serve the entire people of Iraq and protect their constitution in order to prevent a future authoritarian regime. Finally, this thesis presents some recommendations to ongoing development efforts that could provide rigidity to a fragile police infrastructure for the nation of Iraq. If implemented, these recommendations would enhance the Ministry of Interior?s ability to effectively govern, secure, and police the nation in order to provide security and stability and facilitate reconstruction throughout the nation.

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ABSTRACT

IRAQI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES: A CASE STUDY TO EXAMINE
THEIR LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS WHEN THE UNITED STATES AND
COALITION FORCES DEPART, by Winston P. Brooks Jr., 95 pages.

An examination of ethnic demography, historical governments, political parties, force structure, organization, and partnership efforts within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior includes several recommendations that must be accomplished in order to provide permanent security and stability to the nation. These variables must be considered and delicately balanced as the United States and its coalition partners assist the nation of Iraq in its democratization. This thesis examines the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, focusing on the Iraqi Police Services, and the ongoing efforts to provide internal security to the nation without regard to ethnicity, religious beliefs, or political ties. Instead, the reformation of this organization requires an increased national capacity and capability within the Ministry of Interior to sufficiently recruit, vet, and develop an adequate force structure to secure the nation during an extremely complex insurgency. The thesis also identifies the need to develop an organization responsible for nation's internal security that unifies ethnic factions that will protect and serve the entire people of Iraq and protect their constitution in order to prevent a future authoritarian regime. Finally, this thesis presents some recommendations to ongoing development efforts that could provide rigidity to a fragile police infrastructure for the nation of Iraq. If implemented, these recommendations would enhance the Ministry of Interior's ability to effectively govern, secure, and police the nation in order to provide security and stability and facilitate reconstruction throughout the nation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

BG   Brigadier General

CENTCOM   Central Command

CPA   Coalition Provisional Authority

CPATT   Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

DOD   Department of Defense

DOS   Department of State

GEN   General

ICITAP   International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program

INL   International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

IPLO   International Police Liaison Officer

JIPTC   Jordan International Police Training Center

LTG   Lieutenant General

MG   Major General

MNF-I   Multinational Forces-Iraq

MNSTC-I   Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq

MOI   Ministry of Interior

NCO   Non-Commissioned Officer

NSPD   National Security Presidential Directive

TRA   Training Readiness Assessment

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

After a brief war that toppled the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, which shortly followed the events that occurred on 11 September 2001, the United States and its coalition partners remained optimistic about the Global War on Terrorism and their ability to continue the efforts by toppling the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. The March to Baghdad was very successful and Coalition, Iraqi, and other Arab states appeared to strongly support the continued efforts to defeat terrorism. As the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) quickly disestablished former Ba'ath party leaders, prohibited their participation in governmental activities, and dissolved the Iraqi military forces, the establishment of martial law became of utmost importance. Consequently, this would be the task of coalition forces until such time that sufficient Iraqi Army and police forces were generated and reformed to assume this role.

The thesis answers the research question, Will Iraqi Ministry of Interior Forces have the capacity and capability to secure their nation when United States and Coalition forces depart? The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive look at Ministry of Interior forces before and after Saddam Hussein and analyze strategic considerations about the security of regions throughout Iraq and the implications those considerations will have on the withdrawal of coalition forces and the confidence of the Iraqi people. It focuses on demographics, historical rule, political agendas, militia capabilities, and police partnership, and transition efforts. Finally, it focuses on the following measures of Iraqi police training readiness at the local, regional, and national levels:

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1. Forces capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.

2. Forces capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.

3. Forces capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations with coalition support

4. Forces incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

In order to explore the necessary answers, this study will emphasize the implications of previous attempts to stabilize the nation and determine areas of omission or application to reform the Ministry of Interior. The necessary subordinate research questions that follow from the primary question follow.

1. What are the appropriate changes necessary within the Ministry of Interior to provide a safe and secure environment for the nation of Iraq? This thesis examines the significant events relevant to Ministry of Interior Forces in Iraq since its liberation from Saddam Hussein and changes in recruiting, vetting, training, organization and equipment of the Ministry of Interior forces.

2. What implications of cultural differences within the Iraqi populace are necessary to understand when creating such security forces? What are the multi-ethnic and sectarian effects on the security difficulties and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior Forces? Known ethnic and sectarian compositions and political agendas and militia capacities for areas throughout Iraq will be examined for development of such forces in a contemporary operational environment.

3. What capabilities and capacities exist at the local, regional, and national levels and how do they contribute to the Iraqi government? Force structures and organizations, as well as police partnership initiatives of coalition military and diplomats will be examined to determine how they will provide continued stability and security of the nation of Iraq when coalition forces depart.

According to the findings of these questions, Ministry of Interior Forces will require a delicate balance of ethnic, sectarian, and political leaders necessary to prevent degradation of such security and long-term stability of the nation. This study will focus on the required balance necessary to maintain the will of the people.

Background

In planning for the post-conflict Iraq, U.S. strategists and policymakers studied the successes of reconstruction operations of Germany and Japan, but failed to account for cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-sectarian differences of the previous models (Crane and Terrill 2003, 15). Iraq was under the firm control of Sunni Arab leadership for 85 years, which contributed to the depletion of essential services throughout the nation, including the Iraqi Police Forces. The absence of these services became clearly evident after the invasion of Iraq and the collapse of the regime.

The initial Iraqi Governing Council was charged with creating stabilization within the nation of Iraq to facilitate reconstruction and democratization. This council clearly lacked the authority to fulfill such expectations of a country severely oppressed for nearly three decades and the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to consider some of the mistakes made since the British occupation in 1921. The "Dissolution of Entities" developed under Ambassador Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2

severely hindered the security and reconstruction operations as a complex insurgency developed throughout Iraq.

Security conditions throughout the country deteriorated dramatically throughout Iraq as many former government employees were unable to adequately provide necessities for their family members. Some employees resorted to criminal behavior as a means to support their families, while others were left without jobs to adequately support family members. Consequently, attitudes of the populace toward the Iraqi Governing Council began to decline. The people of this Islamic nation began to look to radical religious leaders, such as Muqtada al Sadr, and other clerics for guidance, which led to a large resistance against the council and coalition partners. Influential terrorist organizations and many former Ba'ath party members were easily able to influence the people through monetary rewards. Ethnic and religious militias formed throughout the nation to provide security for their political and spiritual leaders. A diverse, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic nation began to separate itself into factions to protect the freedom they never had under Saddam Hussein.

The Coalition Provisional Authority conducted a "transfer of authority" to the Iraqi Interim Government, led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, in June 2004. Prime Minister Allawi appointed Falah Nakib as Iraqi Minister of Interior. Nakib was a Sunni Arab and former governor of Diyala province under the Iraqi Governing Council. The Iraqi government charged him with developing Iraqi Police Forces capable of establishing security within the cities, regions, and provinces of Iraq.

Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), commanded by GEN George W. Casey, established the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), led by

LTG David H. Petraeus, to reform and develop Ministry of Interior and Defense forces.

LTG Petraeus formed the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), initially

led by UK's Brigadier Andrew Mackay to work in partnership with the Interior Ministry.

United States Department of Justice officials Carr Trevillian and Richard Miller worked

within the joint, combined, and interagency construct of CPATT to gather an initial

assessment of current police training facilities and curriculums and provide guidance on

the development of additional programs throughout Iraq. The US Department of State

also provided a Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Interior, Mr. Steve Casteel, a 32-

year veteran of the Drug Enforcement Agency, to implement political and strategic

advice to Minister of Interior Falah Nakib. MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr. assumed command of

CPATT on 30 September 2004 and rapidly established a rapport with the Minister of

Interior, his senior advisor, and multiple senior ministry officials throughout the nation.

Shortly thereafter, the Minister, with the assistance of coalition planners, determined and

agreed upon 135,000 police forces necessary to protect the stability and security of 27

million Iraqi people, an average ratio of 1:200, and developed a Memorandum of

Agreement to achieve this goal. (Casey and Nakib 2005)

       The successful elections on 30 January 2005 portrayed the progress of the police

forces and saw a newly elected Minister of Interior, Mr. Bayan Jabr, a Shia and member

of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Party. Minister Jabr made

no changes to the agreed force structure requirements after assuming office, and, to date,

numbers indicate over 87,000 trained and equipped Ministry of Interior personnel in

pursuit of the force agreed upon in the memorandum (Cordesman 2006a, 70).

Assumptions

The Iraqi Ministry of Interior will continue to recruit and maintain a force of 135,000 personnel. This assumption is necessary because current coalition leaders have developed institutions and policies that support their withdrawal when such forces are trained, equipped, organized, and capable of securing the nation to further democratize Iraq. Further, this assumption is necessary because insurgencies have historically lasted an average of nine years throughout nations without legitimate governments. These forces will be required, not only to promote the rule of law throughout the nation, but also to quell the insurgency and maintain security at all levels throughout the nation to facilitate democratization of the newly elected government.

Significance of the Study

Today, at both the city and provincial level in several areas, many Iraqi police forces have begun to transition from coalition military to local and regional police control. The integration of police transition teams continues to develop confidence and capabilities among Iraqi leadership at local and provincial levels. At the operational and strategic level, the police partnership program, consisting of coalition military, Department of State officials, and international police liaison officers (IPLOs), has significantly enhanced the Iraqi Ministry of Interior's capability and capacity to exercise control and governance throughout the nation. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense, must continue to establish a secure environment for the nation of Iraq in order to facilitate the withdrawal of coalition military forces. These conditions, if successfully developed, will also enhance the capabilities of the country's diplomatic, informational, and economic development.

Scope

       The scope of this study is to examine not only the progress of the regeneration of Iraqi Police Forces toward the endstate of 135,000 trained and equipped, but also evaluate their ability to assume responsibility for securing their nation.

       The thesis will consist of five chapters, including this introduction, followed by a conclusion chapter.

       The second chapter will briefly review the history and characteristics of former Iraqi Minister of Interior forces to explore possible contributions to the current progress. In doing so, it will examine the primary role of police forces, its officer corps and leadership in domestic politics prior to the U.S.-led invasion. It will also present events pertinent to Ministry of Interior forces prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein and explain how current police forces in Iraq differ from previous Iraqi officer corps and structures.

       The third chapter will explain the methodology to be analyzed to determine implications upon demographics, history, force structure, organization, political agendas, militia capabilities, police partnership and transition efforts.

       The fourth chapter will present and analyze in great detail the areas explained in chapter three. It will focus primarily on regional and national capacity and capability within the Ministry of Interior organization to effectively govern, command, and control forces throughout the eighteen provinces when US and coalition forces depart.

       Finally, the fifth chapter will give a brief background of the analysis, present a summary of the findings, and make possible recommendations for the reintegration of the Iraqi Minister of Interior forces into the political infrastructure.

This thesis utilizes all available unclassified sources. Initial sources will include the following: the orders, regulations, reports, testimonies, and interviews available on the Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S. Defense and State Department websites, news, speeches, and interviews, or about the Coalition or Iraqi Officials' published reports, researches or polls prepared for the House and Senate Armed Service Committees. Secondary sources will include: research papers and books issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and other professional sources, Army and Naval War College, journals, websites of the U. S. Departments of Defense, State, electronic databases, and books on counterinsurgencies, Iraq, Arab society, and Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, several parts of the research originate from personal interviews and journal notes developed by the author while serving in Iraq as the executive officer to the Commanding General of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team. The notes and interviews conducted between September 2004 and July 2005 include: meetings with coalition and Iraqi interim and transitional government officials, briefings with coalition and US Congressional delegates, Iraqi Ministry of Interior officials and leadership, and the European Union.

<u>Limitations</u>

There are several limitations to determining the current effectiveness of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces in Iraq. First, the current training readiness assessments are classified for operational security and utilized as conditions for the current withdrawal of coalition forces. Hence, these assessments will be discussed in general, but the numerical importance will be omitted to protect the operational security of coalition forces. Second, the Ministry of Interior continues to determine the accuracy of their current payrolls

while developing the capability to establish national personnel and finance databases for all of its employees. Consequently, precise personnel numbers will not be used until such systems are perfected. Third, coalition units rotate continuously throughout the nation and reports of effectiveness vary with each of the rotational units. Fourth, the research analysis and conclusion will be limited to only the Iraqi police service within the Ministry of Interior since the ancillary units within the ministry will potentially become local police when the insurgency is quelled. Finally, this research will conclude as of 15 December 2005, the date of the first democratic national election and will not include political appointments or developments thereafter. Despite the potential gaps and various reports, there will be more than adequate information available to analyze the ongoing progress throughout the nation.

Summary

The security and stability of the nation of Iraq is dependent upon the capacity and capability of the Ministry of Interior forces. The withdrawal of coalition forces is also dependent upon the ability of these forces to fight an insurgency, promote the rule of law, and defend the legitimacy of a newly-elected Iraqi government. This study will provide insight into the future of these forces and their ability to secure the nation when US and coalition forces depart. These abilities can not be fully appreciated without first having a clear understanding the oppression and utilization of police forces under the historical leadership since the end of the First World War through the ruthless dictator, Saddam Hussein. The next chapter will examine former Iraqi police services and their influence on the political agendas since the First World War. Additionally, it will highlight such factors that will be relevant for application into the new Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

CHAPTER 2

THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICES: A CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW

<u>Evolution of Iraqi Ministry of Interior Forces</u>

Modern Iraq emerged from the First World War to undergo three historical periods in which police forces among different regimes played an increasing role in the political process of Iraq. The first period includes the British occupation and a Sunni Arab-led Iraqi monarchy that began with the invasion of Iraq by the British and ended in 1958 with a military coup. The second era was a period of military authoritarian regime between 1958 and 1968. Finally, the third period began as a civilian authoritarian regime, under the reign of the Ba'ath party. This regime became totalitarian under Saddam Hussein in 1979. It ended with the U.S. and British-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein on 1 May 2003. As a general trend of these three periods, the Iraqi Police Service, supporting the Iraqi Military and political leaders, became the principal organization for the governments to achieve internal security and to claim state authority in the country and on its ethnic and religious diversities (Erturk 2005, 5). This chapter examines the former Iraqi police services and its influence on the political process and stability of the country since the British occupation. It also addresses ancillary forces developed by MNSTC-I and the CPA after the fall of Saddam Hussein to fight a rapidly growing insurgency. It will only highlight the factors relevant to stability and security of the nation to identify lessons learned for application in the new Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Multiple variables affecting the post-war Iraqi police forces will be presented in a subsequent chapter to facilitate analysis and discussion for future recommendations.

The Iraqi government entered a new period under British influence in 1921 that would be sustained until the coup against the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. During this period, the British and new Iraqi government purged the military and the administration in Iraq from Iraqi nationalists (Library of Congress Country Study 2006b, 3). The British role in Iraqi affairs led to appointments of the most influential leaders during this era. The period of 1941-1958 is characterized as a period of liberalization of Shia, Kurds, and varying ethnicities within the government. Iraq's membership within the Arab League and United Nations eventually led to civil opposition against the British and governing regime. Despite progress in internal reforms and British assistance, a group of nationalist officers overthrew the monarchy on 14 July 1958 (Library of Congress Country Study 2006c, 1).

The 1958 coup resulted in a military regime under the authority of General Abd al-Karim Qasim, a nationalist officer with Communist support. General Qasim relied on the military, the Iraqi Communist Party, and its militias to promote his political agenda from 1958 to 1960. However, Qasim's inability to stem the increasing ethnic, sectarian, and tribal violence led to another military coup, orchestrated by the Ba'ath party and led by Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif in 1963 (Library of Congress Country Study 2006c, 2). However, the military regime removed the Ba'athists from the administration 9 months after the coup, dramatically with the support of some Ba'athist officers, and the military regime survived until its collapse with the Ba'ath takeover in July, 1968, when yet another coup occurred with perfect coordination between the civilians and the military (Erturk 2005, 10). A civilian authoritarian regime emerged, led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, and a second influential man in the administration, Saddam Hussein, was supported by the armed forces and organized the party's institutional structure (Library of Congress

Country Study 2006d, 1). The regime became authoritarian by 1979, with the presidency of Saddam Hussein and his tireless use of police and military forces to promote Ba'athist indoctrination into the people of Iraq.

There were three levels of police forces under Saddam Hussein: Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Assistant Officers, and Officers. At the most basic level, NCOs possessed little formal education, normally only completing primary school. When hired, they were trained within their provincial area in an unstructured program that could last up to three months. Standards and length of training throughout the country varied widely. Upon graduation, NCOs were responsible for most of the daily contact with Iraqi citizens. NCOs were the first responders to calls for service and were responsible for dealing with disputes and for the maintenance of public order (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 55).

At the mid-grades, assistant officers completed secondary or high school education, usually from the police high school, and then underwent on-the-job training. They were normally assigned to various administrative functions within the Iraqi Police Force. They would only respond to serious crimes and only in a supervisory capacity. Their duties usually consisted of administrative work for the Officer Corps (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 55).

Officers were also high school graduates, but were further educated at the Police Professional College in Baghdad, undergoing a three-year course of instruction. Upon graduation, the Officers received the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree in Police Science; however, the curriculum was steeped in military doctrine and training. After graduation, the academy Officers were posted around the country and normally served in the

assigned region for the remainder of their careers. Traditional training in leadership, management, and command and staff functions was not institutionalized (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 55).

During the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein regime, Iraqi Security forces were strictly under civilian control. This era became a politicized security force controlled by civilians of a totalitarian-type regime. Security forces became a tool of the regime rather than a force that served the nation and promoted stability. Ideological indoctrination became one of the main tools of the regime and security forces pledged their allegiance to Saddam Hussein rather than to the nation of Iraq. This influence greatly eroded morale throughout all forces. Authority among leadership was greatly reduced and delegation of tactical decisions at local levels diminished. Administration, logistics, and initiatives became non-existent and capabilities and capacities of institutions and organizations diminished. Corruption throughout the organizations left many security forces without adequate training, equipment, organizational structure, and often times, pay to furnish their family members. When coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, they encountered little resistance from security forces, with the exception of those loyal to Saddam and his Ba'ath party. On 23 May 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer of the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, "The Dissolution of Entities," which disbanded Iraq's military forces and dissolved ba'athist leadership within the police forces (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003b).

The Dawn of a New Era

In 2003, the CPA took the first steps to assist the Ministry of Interior in developing an Iraqi Police Service that would be a respected force based on public trust

and confidence. Creating this force from the brutal and corrupt remnants of the Saddam Hussein regime police would have probably required the dissolution of the entire force necessary to implement the new democratic ideals of Iraq. The security situation, however, required rapid infusion of former police into the cities and provinces, which in turn required an accelerated training program. To optimize the required quantity and equally-important quality, the CPA designed a program based on the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) "Kosovo" model that would give the police recruits eight weeks of standardized training. ICITAP planned to complement the eight-week basic program with a structured field training program pairing each student with an experienced mentor (Miller 2004).

<u>Building Capacity vice Capability</u>

Two academies were established by MNSTC-I in order to meet the initial required capacity of 90,000 IPS within the Ministry of Interior: the Baghdad Public Safety Academy (renamed the Baghdad Police College) and an academy in Amman, Jordan, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). In September 2003, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) constructed and now operates the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) located near Amman to train Iraq law enforcement personnel. Sixteen nations provide a total of 352 international police trainers to the JIPTC. JIPTC has a capacity to train 3,000 Iraqi police recruits in an eight-week, basic police skills course and graduates 1,500 new police every month (Petraeus 2005b). The purpose of JIPTC was to allow coalition partners to contribute in the effort by providing International Police Trainers in a more permissive environment.

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Eight regional academies throughout the nation were subsequently established by MNSTC-I (Fil 2005a).

The basic training instructional program consisted of two distinct, but integrated, components: academy training and field training. New police recruits spent two months at one of the academies, training in modern policing methods. New cadets received 320 standardized hours of intensive education in modern policing techniques. The basic course included academic and practical training in firearms, defensive tactics, and emergency vehicle operation. The academic instruction also included policing in a democracy, constitutional framework, human rights, use of force, police ethics and code of conduct, gender issues, community policing, and traffic management (Miller 2004).

For recruits who completed the academy courses, the concept prescribed subsequent participation in a field training program, focusing on practical application of the coursework and seeking further development of proactive, service-oriented policing skills. During this probationary period, newly-graduated cadets were to be paired with a senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Field Training Officer (FTO), who would serve as a mentor. International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) would oversee the program. The concept consisted of four phases conducted over a 6 month period involving daily, weekly, and monthly evaluations by senior Iraqi Police Service Field Training Officers (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 56-57).

The CPA relied upon building a foundation in the classroom, but also counted on the structured and mentored training that was to occur in the months following graduation from the academies. In March 2004, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

(CPATT) was established by Multinational Force-Iraq, and an initial Field Training

Coordinator Program was implemented locally in Baghdad.

In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 assigned

principal responsibility for training, developing, and equipping the Iraq Security Forces,

including the civilian police, to the U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command

(CENTCOM). On 6 June 2004, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq

(MNSTC-I) was established under the command of LTG David H. Petraeus to assume

responsibility for all Coalition-sponsored security training for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),

including the IPS and Iraqi Military. Consequently, CPATT, under the command of the

UK's Brigadier Andrew Mackay, was organizationally aligned under MNSTC-I. LTG

Petraeus also became the commander of the NATO Training Mission- Iraq (NTM-I), a

unit that continues to equip graduates of the Iraqi Police Academies.

July and August 2004 saw a sharp rise in attacks throughout the nation and

security conditions throughout the country continued to decline (Cordesman 2005b, 21).

In September, LTG Petraeus' staff analyzed previous historical insurgencies and

determined the average number of police necessary to secure the nation should equal

approximately one policeman for every 200 people throughout the country. The last

known census for Iraq exhibited a population of approximately 26,000,000 people of

varying ethnicities (*CIA World Factbook* 2006). Consequently, LTG Petraeus and his

staff met with Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and Minister of Interior Falah Nakib to

discuss the recommendations. Upon agreement, the Coalition and Interim Government

continued their quest to organize, train, and equip 135,000 Iraqi Police Service officials

(Casey and Nakib 2004). On 30 September 2004, MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr. assumed

command of CPATT from Brigadier Mackay.

<u>Insurgent Efforts to Derail the Process</u>

Insurgent attacks on Iraqi Police Service officials continued throughout the month

of October in efforts to destabilize the nation operating under an interim government.

Suicide car bombers, mortars, rockets, and heavy machine guns were used to attack

police stations in Iraq. Police stations in Mosul, Baghdad, and other cities began to

crumble as the police forces were often unable to defend their posts. Police recruiting

stations, minibuses filled with recruits, and senior police officers became primary targets

for the insurgents (Brooks 2004). Consequently, the Highway Patrol and Dignitary

Protection Service was established within the Ministry of Interior in attempt to derail

future attempts and academies began development immediately following. In another

political move, Minister of Interior Nakib announced a new campaign to rid the police

force of corrupt and ineffective members (Brooks 2004).

Police continued to abandon stations throughout Iraq in November and coalition

forces became responsible for securing such areas that had police stations still standing.

On 7 November 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government declared a state of emergency for 60

days. This included the entire nation except the Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and

Sulaymaniyah, which experienced very little turmoil during this period (Brooks 2004).

<u>Developments of Ancillary Forces: Police Commandos</u>

As competition to secure the nation grew between the Ministers of Defense and

Interior, ancillary units began to appear throughout. Falah Nakib hired his uncle, MG

Adnan Thabit, a Sunni Arab, to assemble "Police Commando" units to assist in the fight

against the insurgents. MG Adnan was imprisoned with several other Iraqi people in 1996

under Saddam Hussein in an attempt to assassinate the dictator. A distinguished person

from the city of Samarra, he had the capability to organize and recruit Iraqis rapidly in an

attempt to quell the insurgency. The majority of his police elements were members of

Saddam's Special Forces that maintained a sense of nationalism and were willing to fight

for the democracy of Iraq (Thabit 2004). These forces did not initially receive the formal

police training established by the coalition, but organized as battalions and brigades and

began to integrate with coalition units to fight insurgents in order to allow regular police

forces to continue to train on community policing. Coalition forces were impressed by

their ability and desire to fight the insurgency and decided forces of this type should

continue to grow. These police forces were the first of their kind to deploy outside of an

assigned city or province to take the fight to the enemy. Coalition leaders determined this

would be one of the most effective ways to establish the rule of law to use Iraqi forces

from outside of their habitual region. MG Adnan later hired BG Rashid Flaih, a former

Special Forces soldier with a degree in National Defense as his first Police Commando

Brigade Commander (Rashid 2004). These units would evolve as battalions and three

battalions would form under the command of a brigade. Each battalion would deploy to

areas throughout the nation to fight in conjunction with coalition forces when local police

forces failed. Most notably, the commandos fought alongside coalition forces in Fallujah,

Mosul, Samarra, and Tikrit and occupied former police stations to maintain law and order

when Coalition forces quelled the initial attacks. Today, the Ministry of Interior has four

brigades of Police Commandos under the command of MG Adnan that are utilized to fight the insurgency (Brooks 2005).

Ministry of Interior Public Order Battalions

Another ancillary national, deployable asset developed by the Minister of Interior during this period were the Public Order Battalions. Originally designed as Riot Control Police and trained in An Numiniyah, these units also resembled similar command and control structures like the commandos. Like Adnan, Minister Nakib selected MG Muthir, a family friend to assemble the units. MG Muthir, a former tank brigade commander, staff general in the Iraqi army, relied on previous subordinate commanders to build his battalions (Muthir 2004). These elements assembled as units and trained at Numiniyah Military Base with international police trainers. Upon completion of training, they deployed nationwide where police forces collapsed and failed to maintain law and order upon the completion of military operations. The public order battalions were designed to stay in the city police stations until sufficient numbers of IPS could be generated through the various training academies to effectively police areas with personnel from within their province. Drastic changes in training at Numiniyah including weapons ranges, close quarters raids, and physical fitness were implemented to make these units effective in the cities (Brooks 2005).

Although both the police commando and public order brigades were effective in the fight against the insurgency, they were not Iraqi police service officials and were not programmed to be part of the 135,000 trained police. Hence, these forces brought about many logistical, administrative, and budget challenges to a neglected national ministry headquarters. MNSTC-I and CPATT developed a plan to organize, train, and equip

135,000 IPS and configured their available assets accordingly. When these units formed

and performed successfully, some of the assets within MNSTC-I were diverted to equip

and deploy them in order to take the fight to the insurgents. These forces could not

deploy themselves to areas often times without the assistance of coalition transportation

or escort due to vehicular availability or clearance throughout many of the areas of

responsibility (Brooks 2005). The deployments required close coordination with

commanders in Baghdad to areas where such personnel were needed. Some of the

equipment, such as uniforms and vehicles originally programmed for IPS, was diverted to

these units due to their successes. Payments for their service to the nation were not

originally programmed into the MOI annual budget and an infant monetary system

developed by the Ministry of Finance often led to periods of service without pay (Fil

2005). The Ministry of Interior, plagued with the task of determining accurate payrolls

throughout the nation, experienced yet another problem. Corruption throughout the IPS

led to falsification of employee rosters in many cities and provinces throughout Iraq.

Very little documentation existed for personnel rosters for each of the cities and

provinces throughout the nation prior to the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Many cities had

ghost employees on their rosters to insure the city and tribal leaders were financially

stable. Ghost employees existed in name only to provide additional funds to tribal leaders

throughout the area. Numerous IPS were killed by insurgents and never reconciled on

rosters. There was no automated finance system within Iraq and pay for police forces

throughout cities and regions were conducted manually (Shakir 2004).

The Ministry could not continue to simultaneously hire IPS and the ancillary units

without determining an accurate number of current employees. The capacity of the

National Headquarters in Baghdad was still in shambles from years of neglect. There were no administrative, personnel, intelligence, or logistics databases to track the rapid growth of a national police force. The forces were growing and becoming operational so quickly, the Ministry required the assistance, and intervention in many areas, of coalition forces. LTG Petraeus and MG Fil assembled working groups with each of the departments to assist. These groups consisted of members from the Department of Defense (soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines), the Departments of State and Justice, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, and Coalition nations. These groups worked tediously to develop systems to support the rapid growth and expansion of the ministry. (Brooks 2005)

<div align="center">Reconciliation of Police Forces</div>

None of these departments could further develop without an accurate assessment of the population of the entire Ministry of Interior. Minister Nakib formed a qualifying committee despite resistance from several provincial and regional police chiefs aimed at visiting each of the provinces to determine an accurate employee verification roster. The committee consisted of college-educated, computer literate personnel designed to develop a central employee database for further development and planning. The concept was designed to obtain fingerprints and identification of every IPS, to develop a personnel database and prevent corruption in the Ministry, develop a financial budget to support the IPS operationally and logistically, and reduce the number of "ghost employees" in order to progress toward the endstate upon which Prime Minister Allawi and the coalition agreed (Martelli 2005). The Qualifying Committee received multiple death threats as a

result of the initiative and movement throughout the provinces was inherently dangerous in the onset.

Meanwhile, the IPS continued to organize, train, and equip throughout the country at numerous academies. The curriculum changed significantly with more tactical training to combat the insurgency, more weapons ranges to increase the confidence of police forces, more physical fitness, improvised explosive device training, defensive driving techniques, and combatives, to name a few. The curriculum was standardized by CPATT and distributed to each of the regional academies. These efforts proved to be invaluable to the security of the elections on 30 January 2005. In an interview with Fox news in February 2005, LTG Petraeus briefed that "IPS and Iraqi Army personnel secured over 6,300 polling sites throughout the nation in efforts to begin the conquest toward democracy." (Petraeus 2005a)

<center>The Iraqi Transitional Government</center>

The transitional government elections brought a new Minister of Interior, Bayan Jabr, a Shia from the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq Party. Mr. Jabr conducted a thorough transition with Nakib and Mr. Steve Casteel, a former 32-year employee from the Drug Enforcement Agency remained as the minister's senior advisor. Mr. Casteel had been in Iraq since the CPA and brought continuity and experience to the political posture of the Coalition (Brooks 2005). Jabr received multiple briefings from coalition partners LTG Petraeus and MG Fil to form a great rapport and provide situational awareness of the current state of his ministry. Though he had a different political agenda than the previous minister he made very few initial changes. One of those changes was an attempt to rid the ministry's employees of everyone over the age of

60 years (Brooks 2005). Realizing the importance of some of the current leaders within the nation's ministry, like MG Adnan, the minister agreed to retain the recommendations of Mr. Casteel, LTG Petraeus, and MG Fil. This required a delicate ethnic balance to continue to progress in accordance with the previous agreements.

The capacity and capability continued to gradually increase within the national headquarters with the continued assistance of committees. This initiative was not, in itself, enough to develop the Ministry of Interior to establish stability and security throughout the entire nation. These efforts were directed to improve the performance of the national headquarters.

<center>Emerging Strategy: Coalition Partnership</center>

Local, provincial, and regional IPS still had ineffective headquarters elements resulting from the CPA's de-ba'athification of Iraq. The stations did not have the capacity to gather and disseminate intelligence, determine operational budgets, logistical requirements for their vehicles, equipment, and personnel, and plan or conduct independent operations against insurgent forces. Consequently, CPATT staff, with the approval of MNSTC-I and MNF-I commanders, developed a police partnership program (Watters 2005). Prior to the establishment of the program, there had been no congruent partnering with the MOI and its subordinates. The primary engagement with provincial IPS was through the international police liaison officers (IPLOs). Their access to IPS stations was heavily dependent on insurgency levels and coalition forces priorities as they were dependent upon them for security throughout their visits. The police partnership program was designed to establish a formal relationship between coalition force and provincial police headquarters. The teams would live, eat, and sleep in the same locations

as the IPS. It would align the military and IPLOs with IPS structures to improve their capacities in the deficient areas. This organization could adequately assess the capability of the IPS provincial forces, which would ultimately create the conditions for coalition provincial disengagement. The composition of the teams would vary for each province, but responsibilities would remain uniform. This would allow military and diplomatic leaders to maintain a common operational picture throughout the nation and allow them to prioritize future efforts.

In addition to police partnership teams for IPS, MNSTC-I developed the concept of special police transition teams for the police commandos and public order battalions to assist to increase capabilities in operations, logistics, intelligence, finance and other areas (Petraeus 2005b). These teams, although primarily military intensive, would have the same responsibilities as the police partnership teams, in order to allow senior military and diplomatic leaders to focus efforts to assist. The special police transition teams and police partnership program were responsible for reporting a standard construct that the military transition teams previously began to build for the Iraqi Army. This report was named the transition readiness assessment.

<center>Measuring Capabilities</center>

The Transition Readiness Assessment is a subjective report, similar to the Army's Unit Status Report. The overall assessment consists of four levels. They examine the following:

Level 1- Police Stations are fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent police operations

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Level 2- Police stations are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining police operations with coalition support

Level 3- Police stations capable of conducting police operations in conjunction with coalition units

Level 4- Police stations incapable of conducting police operations (Petraeus 2005b)

To attain this subjective assessment, several sub-categories are evaluated by the partnership teams. The areas are personnel, training, leadership, station effectiveness, force protection, sustainment, equipment, and insurgent activity against IPS. Subjective areas of effectiveness within each of the sub-categories are evaluated on a percentage basis to obtain the aggregate. Percentages corresponding to the colors: green, amber, red, and black are assigned to each of the areas and collated at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels to assist the senior leaders in their decision-making duties. The assessments may vary among personalities, provinces, and regions, but serve as initial step to create the conditions for the disengagement of coalition forces and reduction of footprints in stable and secure areas throughout the nation.

Summary

The Iraqi Ministry of Interior and its forces have evolved from a political tool to a force responsible for promoting stability and security and enforcing the constitution in a democratic society. Strategies and initiatives have continuously improved the effectiveness of the forces. Most recently displayed in the successful elections on 15 December 2005, the Iraqi Police and its ancillary forces continue to improve with the assistance of Coalition Forces. The next chapter will explain the methodology of the

analysis and presentation of the research to determine areas where police forces are improving or faltering in Iraq as the nation continues to establish its legitimacy and democracy. The methodology will provide the variables pertinent to establishing a permanent police force that will protect and serve the people of Iraq and the constitution developed by the newly-elected political leaders.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter examined the chronological evolution of the Iraqi Police

Forces in the post-Saddam Hussein era and the associated criteria necessary to transfer

control to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Security throughout Iraq continues to be the

lynch pin of reconstruction operations. The tribal, ethnic, and religious composition

contributes greatly to the effectiveness of the associated police forces. The Ministry of

Interior must have the capacity and capability to command and control the Iraqi Police

administration, logistics, intelligence, and operations to provide the security necessary for

reconstruction. In order to accomplish such a feat, one must understand such multiethnic

and sectarian divisions, tribe and clan affiliations and desires of population centers as the

framework of Iraq to provide security to the nation. Additionally, one must understand

issues associated with recruiting, vetting, and training such a divided society that will

require a unified effort to secure the nation during a complex insurgency.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the analysis necessary to formulate the

conclusions and recommendations about the future of the Iraqi Police forces. The method

used for analysis in this study is threefold:

The first part of the study will include the historical experiences of the Iraqi

society. The periods covered for the purposes of this research will include:

1. The Ethnic Demographics of the Nation of Iraq

2. British Occupation after the First World War

3. Coups and Coup Attempts

4. Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist Regime.

The historical implications of these periods will be used to determine policies necessary to prevent civil unrest throughout the country. The implications of these historical periods will also identify lessons learned from previous governmental leadership that can be omitted or applied throughout the new democracy.

The second part of the analysis will study the ethnic and sectarian influence on the Iraqi Police Forces. This study will consist of the following two parts:

1. The militia capabilities of ethnic and sectarian communities.

2. The agendas associated with leading political parties in the upcoming democratic elections.

The analysis of these variables will determine the force structure necessary throughout the nation to provide the security necessary for stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future. It will also identify the utility of militias in future roles to protect and serve the entire people of Iraq.

The final part of the analysis will examine the performance, capacity, and capability of the Iraqi Police forces as of 15 December 2005. This analysis will examine the following variables:

1. The force structure and previous and current organization of the Ministry of Interior Forces, specifically Iraqi Police, as of 15 December 2005.

2. Police partnership efforts and the transition readiness assessment developed by the US and Coalition forces.

These factors will determine if the current production of Iraqi Police are receiving the training, equipment, and leadership necessary to secure the nation and prevent future

civil unrest. Additionally, the analysis presents vetting and recruiting issues the coalition faced in the early stages of reforming the nation's police force.

This macroanalysis will determine the force structure and organization necessary to protect and serve the entire people of Iraq and defend the national constitution to prevent future civil unrest in this diverse democratic society. It also addresses political, militia, training, vetting, and recruiting implications to be addressed to form a permanent national police force. Additionally, it will provide a subjective assessment on the current and future direction of the Iraqi Police that will be vital to democratic ideals, economic growth, and reconstruction of a war-torn and neglected society. The next chapter examines each of the aforementioned areas to clearly portray the implications and effectiveness of each area that will be analyzed.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

<u>Societal Implications on Iraqi Police Forces</u>

The main concern for stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq since the

US and Coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein and dissolved Iraq's Ba'athist

leadership continues to be security and civil unrest among multiple factions. The

diversity that exists among religions, tribes, and geography continues to plague the

reconstruction and political efforts necessary to form a democratic society. Before

enforcing the rule of law in such an environment, one must understand the implications

of such diversities. In order to create a successful Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police

force to support the new government and constitution, one must also determine the

affiliated structure, organization, and policy to support it.

The purpose of this chapter is to create an understanding of the diversities of Iraq

and the ongoing efforts to build a permanent police force for the nation. In doing so, one

can determine the necessary centers of gravity of the new Iraqi police forces. The first

part of the chapter focuses on the demographics and historical experiences of the Iraqi

society since the British occupation after the First World War. From this presentation,

one can analyze the views of the various ethnic and sectarian organizations in accordance

with their geographic location. Second, it examines political agendas associated with

potential ethnic and sectarian communities likely to emerge as future leaders. Among the

factions, it will examine the associated militia capabilities of such organizations and their

utility as future police forces. Third, it analyzes the current efforts of the US and its

coalition partners to organize, train, and equip the new Iraqi Police to transfer the

responsibility of security of the nation. This analysis will examine the current Ministry of Interior organization and force structure, partnership and transition efforts, and number of police forces required to achieve stability at the local, regional, and national level. Finally, it presents a comprehensive summary of the findings for use in the final part of the thesis.

<div align="center">Ethnic Demographics</div>

Iraq's diversities vary in both religion and ethnicity. A survey in July 2005 indicated a population of approximately 26 million people (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006). The ethnic groups among the people include Arab (75-80 percent), Kurdish (15-20 percent), and Turkoman, Assyrian or other (5 percent). Religions within the country include Muslim (97 percent), which further contain Shia (60-65 percent) and Sunni (32-37 percent). Jewish and Christian minorities, which include the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox, Armenians, and Catholics, makeup only 3 percent of the total population (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006 and Wikipedia 2006a).

Shiites

Shiite Muslims represent the largest population throughout Iraq's eighteen provinces. Although the southern provinces of Al Basrah, Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Wasit, Al Qadisiyah, andBabil make up their largest density, their ethnic compositions vary throughout the nation. Figure 1. on page 33 identifies the aforementioned provinces. The Shi'i Arabs within the Shia community are the majority within the population of approximately 55 percent (Wikipedia 2006a).

Figure 1.   MNSTC-I Brief, June 2005
Source: COL Chris King, MNSTC-I J-5, Baghdad, Iraq, 13 June 2005.

Despite the Shia Arab majority of the Iraqi populace, many religious and secular

groups and sub-groups exist, each having a different political agenda. The Al-Dawa , the

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Sadr Group (led by the

young radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and Hawza al Ilmiya (circle of scholars) and

its leader Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani have become the main competitors of power

struggle in Iraq, not only with other political establishments, Shiite or non-Shiite, but also

amongst themselves in the post-war period (Erturk, 2005, 34). Each of the differing

parties understands the opportunity to seize power for the first time since the British

occupation and continues to organize accordingly to assume power through

democratization. Successful democratization of Iraq depends on the ability to unite such diverse political parties.

<u>Kurds</u>

Kurds comprise the second largest ethnicity in Iraq with 21 percent and reside mainly in the provinces of Dahuk, Arbil, and As Sulaymaniyah (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006 and Wikipedia 2006a). Refer to Figure 1.on page 33 for provincial locations. While most of the Kurdish population are Sunni Muslims, a small portion of them are also Shiite Muslims, named Feili Kurds (Lattimer 2003, 6). The Kurdish provinces continued their pursuit for autonomy after the rise of Saddam Hussein, but required the addition of the Kirkuk oil fields in At Tammim province for economic growth. Saddam Hussein's military launched chemical attacks that resulted in deaths of many people from the Kurdish region after Ba'ath party officials accused them of cooperating with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Operation Desert Storm facilitated autonomy for the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq and the leaders capitalized on the opportunity to improve their militant forces, political efforts, and economic stance. Two political groups emerged during the period after the first Gulf War. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP), led by Masud Barzani assisted coalition forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom by repelling Iraqi military forces in the northern region of the country. The parties consolidated political agendas after the war, but kept their own administrative and military organizations. Consequently, the leaders benefited greatly and were selected to serve in positions of national authority as part of the Iraqi Transitional Government in Baghdad (Wikipedia 2006d). However, tensions continue to simmer among tribes over possession

of the At Ta'mim province in order to adequately provide the economic growth to support an autonomous territory. This issue must also be resolved as part of the initial formulation of unified nation.

Sunnis

Sunni Arabs make up approximately 18.5 percent of the populace and predominantly reside in the provinces of Anbar, Salah ad Din, Ninawa, At Ta'mim, and Diyala (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006 and Wikipedia 2006a). Figure 1 on page 33 displays the provincial geography. Some still reside in Baghdad as a result of their government dominance since the 1960s. Leading political parties in the post-Saddam Hussein era include the Conference of Iraqi People, the Independent Iraqi Alliance, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, each with differing political agendas, yet a common theme of remaining as representative power for the nation (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006). Concerns continue to rise among Sunni Arabs since the Coalition Provisional Authority's Order Number Two dissolved the nation's security forces and removed former Ba'ath party officials from key police, military, and their associated ministerial positions. Consequently, they continue to be a key target of terrorist and extremist recruiting efforts in an attempt to destabilize the nation.

Assyrians, Turcomans, Chaldians, Armenians, and Mandians

The final 6 percent of the Iraqi population consists of Assyrians, Turcomans, Chaldians, Armenians, and Mandians (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006 and Wikipedia 2006a). This population mainly resides in Kirkuk, Mosul, Irbil, Salahaddin, and Diyala (See Figure 1 on page 33 for geographic locations). As of November 2005, there were no

political parties represented by the Turkmen (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006). Christians, including the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox, Armenians, and Catholics represent 3 percent of the ethnic populace and the miniscule remainder is represented by Jews, the majority of which reside in Baghdad (Lattimer 2003, 6). These groups are affiliated with Yunadim Kanna and the Assyrian Democratic Party and maintain one representative in the Iraqi Governing Council as part of the Iraqi Transitional Government (Iraq-*CIA World Factbook* 2006).

Tribal Application

Religious and ethnic diversity in Iraq require meticulous attention in democratization, but tribal affiliations throughout Iraq are very important to security, stability, and reconstruction within the country and also require attention. "There are an estimated 100 major tribes, 25 tribal confederations, and several hundred cohesive clans in Iraq, and experts estimate that perhaps 40 percent of Iraqis still feel a close affinity to their tribes" (Sachs 2004, 4). From 1921 to 1958, tribal chiefs possessed significant political influence in Iraq to influence the government's objectives. Many of the tribal chiefs lost their political voice as the Ba'ath party emerged in the late 1960s. The Ba'athist ideology viewed tribal leadership as an obstruction to improve society and spread their political agenda. Hence, the nation's reconstruction efforts since the fall of Saddam Hussein have seen a sharp rise in the importance of such influential leaders in an attempt to use their recruiting abilities to reform the nation's police forces.

Historical Overview

The Iraqi Ministry of Interior, arguably one of the most important organizations responsible for a new democratic nation, has not historically protected and served the entire people of Iraq. The police have traditionally been an extension of Iraq's military and utilized to enhance the political goals of local, regional, and national leadership. Social, sexual, racial, and ethnic discrimination was common in recruitment, employment, and promotion throughout the force. Plagued by corruption, this organization failed to portray a unified view of the Iraqi people. Factors for such problems were exacerbated by political leaders and their ideologies, such as the previously mentioned Ba'athists, SCIRI, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Lack of a unified vision by ethnic and sectarian tribes, clans, and leaders, security challenges throughout the country, non-existence of national policies, and a reliance on militias has historically plagued the nation of Iraq.

The British occupation after the First World War represents a historical period of Iraq's history that magnifies this spectrum of difficulties. For example, the British mandate failed to portray a unified view of the people throughout the nation of Iraq as it empowered Sunni Arab leader King Faisal to enforce the mandate, despite representing a minority of the overall populace. Although Shiites, Kurds, and other ethnicities participated in police and military activities, key positions within the leadership were occupied by Sunni Arabs, which became an extension of King Hussein and his associated political agendas. Discrimination of ethnic factions and an unsynchronized ideology of the Sunni Arabs failed to effectively build a nation with unified views of the people of Iraq.

Even after the monarchy's collapse, Sunni Arabs continued to lead governmental organizations. The repression of other factions throughout the nation continued and a common ideology could not be established to effectively build a national identity. Consequently, ethnic strife continued to grow throughout the nation and a growing sense of division and insecurity throughout the region began to emerge. Tribal militias began to form to provide security for ethnic factions throughout the nation. Militias continued to increase throughout the nation as stability deteriorated and a growing rift among factions continued throughout a series of coups and coup attempts from 1958-1969. The parliamentary government in Baghdad created by the British Monarchy continued to perform in name only as ministries were led by Sunni Arab politicians, a small demographic representation of the total population. Administrative and logistical functions of the structures were largely ignored and the effectiveness of such services rapidly digressed.

The Sunni Arab ideology within the Ba'ath party, continued to divide the nation. Positions throughout the police, military, and governmental bodies were assigned as a reward of loyalty to the party's leadership. The party's leader, Saddam Hussein, continued to repress Shiites in southern Iraq. Social and political agendas of Shia clerics and leaders were continually ignored despite their loyalty to the nation during the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam Hussein's retaliation with Republican Guard soldiers and chemical attacks on Kurdish families in the north during their attempts to seek autonomy further divided the nation. Other ethnicities remained powerless and made no attempt to influence governmental decisions.

The economic sanctions imposed after Operation Desert Storm in 1991 weakened Saddam Hussein's authority as Shiite uprisings in southern Iraq and Kurdish revolts in northern Iraq undermined the authority of the state. Consequently, Hussein continued to build a personal security force based solely on loyalty, tribal, and family affiliations and equipped them accordingly. Furthermore, regular police and military forces were deprived of the benefits associated with his Republican Guard and were forced to adapt under less provisional circumstances.

This evidence clearly suggests Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party ideologies did not represent the holistic view of the Iraqi populace. The invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in 2003 found a society complicated by ethnic and sectarian strife. In fact, coalition forces capitalized on the ethnic division in the Northern provinces to assist in Operation Iraqi Freedom. One must understand these divisions individually to determine appropriate force structures and organizations at provincial, regional, and national levels to build the infrastructure to support a national police force. In doing so, one must also have a thorough understanding of their recent historical experiences.

The historical experiences of a nation provide great insights for its security and stability when a former leader is ousted from power. Despite avoiding a civil war, Iraq has never formed a unified democratic government in which all ethnic, religious and tribal representatives agreed upon the constitution of their nation. The nation has been governed by minority Sunni Arabs that used violence and conflict through police and military forces to influence the associated political agendas since the end of World War One. The next section examines three historical periods in depth to better understand the complications the people of Iraq experienced since the end of the First World War. The

first period analyzes the years 1921-1958 during the British Occupation and the Independent Monarchy. The second period includes a series of coups and coup attempts between 1958 and 1968. Finally, this section examines the rise of the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein. The historical analysis of the three distinct periods captures lessons learned that can be avoided or incorporated into the reformation of the new Ministry of Interior police forces.

British Occupation

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain (Library of Congress Country Study 2006e, 1). Prior to British rule in Iraq after their invasion during World War I, Shiite religious leaders and the Sharyfians in Syria envisioned the formation of an Arab Islamic State "ruled by an Arab Muslim king, one of the sons of…Sharyf Husayn, bound by a national legislative assembly based in Baghdad (Nakash 2003, 65). The San Remo resolutions placed Iraq under the British Mandate and Shiite clerics strived to achieve unity between Shias and Sunnis. The Shia tribes in the lower Euphrates rebelled in August 1920 after the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Shirazi that proclaimed "none but Muslims have a right to rule over Muslims" (Crane and Terrill 2004, 6). The 1920 rebellion was dismantled and the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs, as a result of their assistance with British forces, to control the colonized country after the First World War (Library of Congress Country Study 2006e, 2). This decision was made despite displeasure from the Shiites, Kurds, Turcomans, and other minority ethnicities.

British leaders continued to build Sunni domination within the government as Shiites refused to provide representation based on religious rulings issued by their clerics that prohibited participation. Discrimination policies within the government eventually excluded Shiites from the government, civil services, and Iraqi military and police forces and Sunni Arab influence became dominant in the security forces (Kubba 2001, 63-68). As Shiites continued to represent more than 50 percent of Iraq's population during this period, they occupied only 25 percent of the government positions. Shiites expressed their desires to exist under British rule instead of the Sunnis as religious directives from their respective clerics were removed. The British role in Iraqi government affairs did not change the existing governmental posts to accommodate the Shia Arab desires and Sunni Arab leaders continued to control key governmental positions (Library of Congress Country Study 2006e, 4.).

British influence in Iraqi governance offered very few benefits to the people of Iraq. The power of tribal chiefs to exercise influence over the populace diminished, insufficient religious education within the government structure disenfranchised Shia clerics, and disputes over oil revenues for Kurdish economic growth continued to hamper security efforts. For example, the 1924 constitution granted the British monarchy the right "to confirm all laws, to call for a general election, to prorogue parliament, and to issue ordinances for the fulfillment of treaty obligations without parliamentary sanctions" (Library of Congress Country Study 2006e). Election results in urban areas were decided by confrontations and compromises between the government, tribal sheikhs, and landlords (Elliot 1966, 8-13).

Security problems within Iraq during this period mainly arose as a result of ethnic and/ or tribal disagreements with different political and economic desires, such as autonomy, objection to conscription, taxes, land or irrigating privileges, and riots, particularly as a consequence of the deteriorating economic conditions of the urban population during and after the Second World War (Erturk 2005, 41). The Sunni Arab Iraqi government exploited landlords and tribal leaders and influenced its authority throughout the country by using its military and police forces to provide internal security. Arab nationalism emerged as the ideology due to influence from government authority. Ethnic movements and rebellions from non-Arab communities grew throughout the country. Conscription policies to expand the nation's security forces and strengthen the government's authority threatened different ethnic and tribal communities as Sunni Arabs occupied key leadership roles. Personal security concerns of tribal chiefs caused unrest in the country as political institutions continually oppressed the people.

On October 13, 1932, Iraq became a sovereign state, and it was admitted to the League of Nations. Iraq still was beset by a complex web of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts, all of which retarded the process of state formation. The declaration of statehood and the imposition of fixed boundaries triggered an intense competition for power in the new entity. Sunnis and Shias, cities and tribes, shaykhs and tribesmen, Assyrians and Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi nationalists--all fought vigorously for places in the emerging state structure. Ultimately, lacking legitimacy and unable to establish deep roots, the British-imposed political system was overwhelmed by these conflicting demands(Library of Congress Country Study 2006b, 1).

In March 1945, Iraq became a founding member of the Arab League in an effort to foster Arab unity in the Middle East. The number of ministerial positions increased for other ethnic communities in the 1940s and 1950s in an effort to prevent movements against the ruling government. However, Sunni Arabs remained in key positions in the civilian and military bureaucracy and strict restrictions continued for the Shi'is entry to

the police academies, as well as against the very small number of Shi'i officers on the police force (Nakash 1994, 123-127). The Shiites made a political attempt to demand for direct elections instead of official candidate lists in 1952 to no avail due to military police forces called by the Iraqi government.

Communism and Islamic ideology began to spread in Iraq as a result of the political failures. The Communist Party became effectual within the Kurdish population, with the catchwords emphasizing Kurdish rights and autonomy (Sluglett and Sluglett 1990, 27). Among the educated Shiites mostly from urban areas, who controlled the high level party organizations, as a response to the government's reluctance to share power, the revival of Islamic Ideology and its politicization with the al-Dawa Party, was not only a result of an intent to create an Islamic State in Iraq, but was a consequence of the fear of the Shiite clerics over the spread of communism within the young generation of Shiites (Nakash 2003a, 129-134). Diminishing economic conditions additionally attributed to the will of the people that caused multiple riots throughout the country. On July 14, 1958, the Iraqi Monarchy ended with a military coup led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim and other free officers (Wikipedia 2006b and Library of Congress Country Study 2006c, 1).

<u>Military Rule</u>

The period shortly following the fall of the Iraqi Monarchy led to the birth of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and their alliance with General Qassem (Wikipedia 2006b and Library of Congress Country Study 2006a, 1). Supported solely by the party's militias, the political leaders struggled to obtain support of the populace to exert authority. From 1958-1963, land reform, housing policies, and developments in education and health services weakened the influence of the Shia land owners in favor of the poor

Shiite population in the cities and the Shiite peasants (Erturk 2005, 43). Limitations on Shia attendance to the police academies and police colleges were also lifted in an effort to increase support for the party. However, Sunnis continued to dominate the officer corps of Iraq's security forces as they composed 70 percent of all officers in the Iraqi security forces, with Shiites making up only 20 percent and Kurds and other minorities ten percent (Sharp 2005, 2).

The Iraqi Communist Party's ideology promoted many security problems throughout the country. Communism was opposed by Arab nationalists, primarily Sunni, and Islamist Shia religious clerics and political leaders. Additionally, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal diversity grew which caused "serious political violence, the most evident of which were the infamous massacres in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad" (Kubba 2001, 67). Kurdish groups sympathetic to the ICP clashed with Sunni Arab nationalists and jealous Turcomans in Mosul and Kirkuk, a bloody battle occurred, and many Torcomans were killed in pursuit for Kurdish autonomy. The ICP security forces could not suppress the Kurdish rebellion, which led the country into a political stalemate. Security conditions continued to waiver in Baghdad and other large cities within Iraq. A period of considerable instability followed. Qassem was overthrown in February 1963. His inability to calm ethnic and sectarian violence further damaged the legitimacy of the government. The Ba'ath Party organized the coup against Brigadier Qasim and took power under the National Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC) leadership of General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr (prime minister) and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (president). Nine months later `Abd as-Salam Muhammad `Arif led a successful coup against the Ba`th government. Arif became chairman of the NCRC, commander in chief

of the armed forces, and president of the republic. On 13 April 1966, President Abdul

Salam Arif died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by his brother, Major General

Abd ar Rahman Arif. Following the June 1967 War between Israel and other Arab states,

Arif's government was severely weakened due to an inadequate political platform and

corruption throughout the national leadership. In 1967, the Baath party reorganized and

created a strong militia and intelligence capability that gave the party more support

throughout the nation. On 17 July 1968, the Ba'ath Party felt strong enough to retake

power (Wikipedia 2006b and Library of Congress Study 2006a, 1-4). Shia resentment in

the south against pan-Arabism continued Masud Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic

Party (KDP) continued efforts in the north to negotiate an autonomous Kurdish Province

with the new leadership and the rebels and Iraqi government reached a political

agreement to a fifteen article peace plan in 1970 (Library of Congress Country Study

2006d, 2).

Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist Regime

Iraq's Ba'ath Party was originally founded between 1949 and 1952 by Fuad al-

Rikabi, a Shiite engineering student from Nasiriya. Its ideological goals of socialism,

freedom, and unity appealed to Iraqis that suffered during the monarchy from economic

difficulties and suppression of political freedoms. Initially, members were Shiite Arabs

and friends and relatives of Rikabi. Three divisions of the party developed shortly after

the 1963 coup against General Qasim. These divisions were based on personal, factional,

and sectarian ties. Within the divisions, the "centrists", mainly Sunni Arabs, attained the

power within the party. Eventually, the representation of the Shiites in various regional

leadership positions declined from 54 percent to 14 percent during the period of 1963 and

1970 in favor of the Sunni Arabs, particularly in favor of the Sunni Arabs, mostly from Tikritis, when the Ba'ath Party took over the Iraqi authority in 1968 (Baram 1991, 1-11). 14 July 1968 brought to power the Ba'thist general Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Disagreements within the party continued, and the government periodically purged any group or person suspected of challenging Baath rule between 1968 and 1973. Intelligence services continued to grow throughout the nation and by 1978, the party's militia number close to 50,000 men. Emerging as a party strongman, Saddam Hussein eventually used his growing power to push al-Bakr aside in 1979 (Wikipedia 2006c and Library of Congress Country Study 2006d, 1).

Sunni representation within governmental positions continued to rise with the strength of the Ba'ath party and its leader, Saddam Hussein. Family and friends from Saddam's Sunni Arab tribe from Tikrit occupied key upper-level positions in government, the military, and noteworthy, the police. Although Shia and other ethnicities continued to pursue positions, "the most important positions in the government, army and internal security remained safely in Sunni-Arab hands (and, to a large extent, in the hands of people hailing from Tikrit, General Bakr's and Saddam Husayn's hometown)"(Baram 2002b, 23). These organizations contained a representative sample of the population, but remained under the personal control of Saddam Hussein. Family and tribal influence from Tikrit essentially governed the nation of Iraq.

Internal security issues continued during the initial reign of Saddam Hussein as the Kurdish rebels continued to strive for autonomy in the north and Shiite guerilla movements developed as a result of their ongoing oppression. Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani continued to work with Iran to facilitate support for their political motives

even after the Iran-Iraq wars. Shiite guerilla movements in the south continued as a result of religious oppression, but failed to form an alliance with Iran. The Iraqi Shiites fought against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in an effort to show that their loyalty to the Iraqi state (Nakash 2003a, 96-99).

Saddam Hussein continued to use police and military forces for internal security problems against Kurdish rebels, Shiite guerillas, and the civilians that supported them. "The level of violence initiated and orchestrated by the state against its own citizens [was] one of the worst throughout the region (Kubba 2001, 71.)." Additional security responses include the use of chemical weapons in Halabja and Dujail in March 1988 against the Kurdish population that resulted in the death of an estimated 4,000 people including women and children. Shiite uprisings in the south after the First Gulf War in March 1991 silenced by the Republican Guards cost an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 civilian casualties (Tripp 2002, 240-247).

The United Nations also imposed economic sanctions that hampered the ability of Iraq to sell its oil for further development and limited the imports of the nation (Tripp 2002, 259-263). These efforts caused further divide between the ethnic and sectarian communities of Iraq for different reasons. Kurdish leaders seeking political autonomy from the Iraqi government continued to develop their police and military forces, despite their limitations on economic development. Shia Arabs continued to be oppressed by Saddam's Ba'ath party, despite efforts to gain political momentum. Unfortunately, the US led-coalition was forced to deal with such ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and religious tensions as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Coalition efforts to provide stability,

security, and reconstruction to a sovereign nation under a new government have confronted many of the same issues that arose as a direct result of the Ba'athist regime.

Historical Synthesis

One of the most important observations this historical period is the fact that Iraq has not experienced a civil war since the 1921 British Mandate and the Iraqi Monarchy. However, the country has also never possessed a unified government with equal representation in not only its national leadership positions, but also its parliamentary and security apparatuses. Thus, the following observations from historical events of Iraq since 1921 are necessary for consideration in future internal security operations for the nation.

1. Sunni Arab governments representing less than twenty percent of Iraq's population have been a potential factor for the instability that has plagued the nation for the last eighty-five years. Shia, Kurd, Turcoman, and other ethnic and sectarian people were not afforded the opportunity to serve in key posts within the government and its police and armed forces;

2. The importance of tribal structure and family loyalty has plagued the nation's political and security institutions when used for the wrong reasons. Consequently, the nation has never achieved a national identity due to their inability to unify rival ethnic and sectarian factions and allow them to compete for key ministerial positions;

3. Shiites and Kurds resent Sunni dominance throughout the ministries, but both have contrasting political agendas that will require attention during the reformation of the nation. Shia clerics and leaders long for a different regime with an Islamic republic, while Kurdish political leaders continue to seek an autonomous "Kurdistan", with their own internal security forces. Kurdish leaders continue to seek the city of Kirkuk for economic

gain, which continues to provoke security issues with ethnicities that co-exist in the region.

4. The fact that Iraq has not experienced a civil war since 1921 may be followed by the fact that the rulers of all three historical periods used police and military forces to enforce their ideals. The use of such forces is not only linked to the Saddam Hussein regime on Kurdish rebels and Shiite guerilla movements, but was also used during the British occupation and Iraqi Monarchy and the series of military leaders before the rise of the Ba'ath party.

Militia Capabilities of Ethnic and Sectarian Communities

The ethnic and sectarian demographics of a country must be considered in order to thoroughly understand potential flashpoints of security and stability operations. Historical tensions among rival factions continue to cause security concerns throughout the nation. The political agendas of rival factions are only as strong as their associated militia capabilities. In Iraq, attacks on civilians, guerilla warfare, and other tactics were used to promote agendas and strive for economic resources or, in some cases, autonomy. Hence, security concerns motivate the groups to establish their own defenses and further threaten the internal security of the nation. This section will examine the capacity, capabilities, and influence of militia forces and their influence on reconstruction operations.

After Saddam Hussein's Regime was toppled in May 2003, violence continued to escalate against the Coalition Provisional Authority, international organizations, and Iraqis that cooperated with them. These attacks and the emerging sectarian threat became the biggest threat to the US-led stability and reconstruction efforts:

More than a dozen militias have been documented in Iraq, varying in size from less than a hundred to tens of thousands of members. Some were organized in loose cellular structures, while others had a more conventional military organization. Some were concentrated around a single locale, while others had a more regional footprint. Some of them were wholly indigenous, while others received support such as training, equipment, and money from outside Iraq. Typically, the militias were armed with light weapons and operated as cells or small units. Even if they do not take up arms against the government, militias can pose a long-term challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the central government. This was the driving force behind the creation of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91 and the Transition and Re-Integration Committee. For the same reason, Article 27 of the Transitional Administrative Law and Article 9 of the draft Iraqi Constitution prohibit armed forces or militias that are not part of the Iraqi Armed Forces (Department of Defense 2005, 24).

The previously superior Sunni Arab leadership began to fear its loss of power throughout the nation and became easy recruits for transnational terrorist organizations. Insurgencies began to take place elsewhere throughout the country. Radical Shiite militias escalated attacks against coalition forces in the southern provinces and in parts of Baghdad. Iraqi civilians became not only victims, but also culprits of the attacks.

As the security situation throughout the country continued to dissolve, Shia leaders seized the security situation in an effort to gain political momentum. The Shiites planned to take control of the political leadership within Iraq during the first democratic election to be held in January 2005. As Shiites continued to welcome the upcoming elections, tensions increased in other parts of the country and the violence against them continued to grow. The intent of the attacks was to provoke civil unrest between Shia and Sunni communities, but clerics continued to invoke calmness upon the people in preparation for the coming elections.

Multiple attacks continued throughout the country prior to the January elections, which made militia groups popular to the people of such diverse ethnic and sectarian communities in their quest for security. However, militias threatened the security of

neighboring communities, making it virtually impossible to promote a unity of effort throughout the nation.

> Almost all ethnic and sectarian groups have their own militias with an estimated number of 100,000. Of these militia groups, the larger ones are the Kurdish Pashmarga (almost 70,000 under the control of two Kurdish groups, PUK and KDP), the Badr brigade, the militia force of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 20-30,000 militias, although it was named as the "Badr Organization after coalition officials banned party militias in 2003, and the militia force of Moqtada al-Sadr, the Mahdi Army, "the first Shia militia to organize on the ground" in the summer of 2003. (Erturk 2005, 58-59).

After the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, Sunni Arabs started to establish their own militias in order to employ them in possible future problems with other groups (Crane and Terrill 2003, 24-25). Consequently, episodes of illegal violence among ethnic and sectarian communities continued despite the CPA's attempt to dissolve such security forces.

Negotiations began with the Peshmerga and Badr Organizations continued in an attempt to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) them into the new Iraqi police and armed forces. However, the Mahdi militia was viewed as an insurgent organization from previous attacks against the coalition in April and August 2004 and was not included as part of the new security force (Department of Defense 2005, 26). Ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and political ties continued to influence command and control, despite integration efforts to include them into the newly formed security services. Thus, tribal chiefs, religious and political leaders still possessed potential to use key personnel from former militias to repress political rivals to support their agenda. Diplomats must strongly consider the militia capacity of tribal and political leaders in the upcoming elections to prevent history from repeating itself during the formation of such a fragile democracy.

<u>Tribal and Political Agendas of Ethnic and Sectarian Leadership</u>

The Bush Administration has deemed the rapid creation of an effective Iraqi fighting force as key to stabilizing Iraq and expediting the eventual withdrawal of U. S. forces. The fiscal year 2005 supplemental spending request seeks $3.1 billion to train the Iraqi police forces. The rationale for this effort is that a well-trained, well-equipped Iraqi army and police force can be effective in quelling the insurgency and can help smooth the process for restoring full sovereignty to a new Iraqi government. U.S. policymakers envision the new Iraqi security forces to be representative of Iraqi society at large. A goal is for the new Iraqi security forces to transcend Iraq's religious and ethnic boundaries and keep the country unified while fighting an insurgency (Sharp 2005, 1).

Political itineraries of diverse ethnic, sectarian, and tribal leaders directly correlate to the security forces of Iraq. The previously discussed history of the nation clearly outlines the difficulties associated with security as the people of the nation attempt to form a new democratic society. Therefore, Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish agendas must be examined to determine if such parties will be able to provide equitable internal security throughout the nation to facilitate reconstruction efforts.

From the historical examination, this will be the first opportunity for the Shiite community to lead the nation of Iraq in eighty-five years. Shiite politicians and clerics are likely to be very involved in the future democratic society as they provide sixty percent of the nation's population. Consequently, Shiite beliefs and the influence of Shiite clerics will also likely be imposed within the Ministry of Interior forces, which could likely increase opposition from Sunni Arab and Kurdish leaders. Since Sunni Arab leaders have ruled the nation since the 1921 British Mandate, they have growing concerns of an Islamic government like the former rival country, Iran. Kurdish leaders voice similar concerns and continue to strive for autonomy with their own internal security forces. Again, diplomats and coalition forces must insure Shia beliefs and religious influence do

not reflect the view of the nation's interior forces, but rather a unified view to protect and serve the entire people of Iraq.

Although most Shiite groups seek a unified nation for the future of Iraq, views differ among the factions for the type of government to be formed. Two prominent concepts of a future government have grown within the Shiite community: Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani supports an exclusion of religious leadership from politics known as quietism, while the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the al-Dawa party, and Moqtada al-Sadr support the inclusion of church and state, known as activism. The latter concept continues to be a source of tension throughout governmental organizations in Iraq. In this environment, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani has emerged as the most reliable Shiite cleric with his moderate views that emphasizes the necessity of elections, the significance of the demobilization of all militias, and the need to respect other traditions (Wikipedia 2006c).

As Shiites pursue their rise to power as part of the newly formed democracy, Sunni Arabs continue fight for equal representation within the governmental organizations and interior security services. The de-Ba'athification of Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority left additional concerns among Sunni Arabs as their leading roles in police and army forces rapidly deteriorated (Coaliton Provisional Authority 2003a). This environment facilitated the growth of militant groups throughout the nation that continues to plague the coalition's security efforts. Defense and Interior ministries were historically dominated by Sunni Arab leadership and were utilized to influence political goals.

From a Kurdish perspective, political leaders were able to capitalize on Shia and Sunni Arab differences and unify their efforts within the government hierarchy. Masud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), established a foothold within the Iraqi Transitional Government and continued to pursue an independent Kurdistan. This desire will likely continue to forge disagreements throughout the ministries and exists as a continued flashpoint for instability throughout the region. Hence, the discussion of integrating Kurdish security forces as part of Iraq's interior forces must also be addressed as part of the new democracy.

Clerics, tribal leaders, and political party representatives will continue to play an important role in constitutional development and democratic elections. Results will likely reflect the viewpoints of such influential leaders throughout the nation. Therefore, these leaders must be examined and monitored to prevent potential security problems similar to those developed by the Sunni Arabs as a result of their abuse of power. Future policymakers require continuous oversight to prevent the formation of Ministry of Interior forces based on ethnic and sectarian lines like the ones that existed during the Ba'athist regime.

Militia Capability and Political and Religious Agenda Synthesis

Security concerns continue as leaders fail to achieve political objectives and attempt to use their militias against the fragile governmental security forces. This issue continues to hamper reconstruction efforts and press the potential for a civil war along ethnic and sectarian lines throughout the country. Consequently, the Ministry of Interior forces will require a delicate balance and inclusion of political, religious, and tribal

representation of all factions. These factions must not only be included in the recruitment of police forces to provide local and regional security but also require continuous oversight to prevent the reformation of militias along ethnic and sectarian lines to influence agendas like those of the Ba'athist regime. The Mehdi Army, Badr Organization, Peshmerga forces, and Sunni Arab leaders must be delicately integrated into the Ministry of Interior's police forces throughout the country and used to enforce the rule of law established by the elected political leaders of the nation. As previously mentioned, potential flashpoints of Kirkuk, Baghdad, and other ethnically diverse cities require continuous scrutiny to maintain security of the people within those areas. In this environment, the nation of Iraq will require strong and unified leaders to enforce the authority of the government and provide internal security of the nation.

Force Structure of Ministry of Interior Forces

Many critics will argue the mistake of dissolving Iraq's security forces, but the intent of policymakers within the coalition was to encourage the Iraqis to police the nation for themselves. This was a feasible course of action initially, but many diplomats underestimated the Ministry of Interior's capacity to execute this procedure. When the CPA realized this lack of capability, Ambassador Paul Bremer announced on 23 May 2003, his intent to build "a new Iraqi corps, as the first step in forming a national self defense capability for a free Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003b). The United States and its Coalition partners immediately noticed this would be an integral part of their strategy for Iraq's sovereignty. This section examines the structure of the Ministry of Interior.

The Ministry of Interior initially had administrative, but not operational control of the Iraqi Police Service. As discussed in chapter 2, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), commanded by LTG David H. Petraeus, was formed to develop Iraq's police and defense forces as part of the CPA's transition strategy and began doing so in June 2004. MG Joseph F. Fil was selected to serve as the Commanding General of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) within MNSTC-I in September 2004 to develop the Ministry of Interior's capacity and capability to secure the nation of Iraq. In order to adequately understand the force structure required to secure the nation of Iraq, CPATT developed a staff estimate of personnel to be trained based upon populations within provinces cities throughout Iraq and compared them to police force ratios in nations throughout Europe. See table 1 for details. This estimate required an average ratio of police to civilians of 1:200 and constituted an estimated endstrength of such forces of 135,000 (Byrd 2004).

MNSTC-I and CPATT experienced great difficulty in obtaining the initial police force strength due to the CPA's decision in the post-war to reform the Iraqi Police Services instead of dissolving it. The initial intent of the police forces was to establish law and order among the Iraqi population and take pressure off Coalition forces experiencing guerilla style attacks in a low-level insurgency. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior's administration lacked the capacity to provide accurate personnel employment numbers under Saddam Hussein. Many of the Iraqi Police that served under the regime either abandoned their positions or were casualties of war, which made accurate assessments even more complex. Consequently, the CPA and Ministry of Interior ordered all police to report to work in July 2003 in an attempt to gain an estimate

55

to determine the number of police required to be trained to attain the endstrength of

135,000. Those failing to do so faced immediate termination. According to the

International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program, an estimated 38,000

police forces returned to duty in July 2003, thus requiring 97,000 Iraqi police forces to be

recruited, trained, and equipped.

Table 1. CPATT Staff Estimate Developed September 2004					
Province	Population Estimates	Historically Reported Authorized Current Strength	Troop-2-Task Brief (Based on MSC eval)	CPATT Rec'd (Based on 1:199 Ratio)	Rec'd End Strength And Resulting Ratio
Basrah	2,009,707	8,653	12,966	10,099	13,357 (1:150)
Dhi Qar	1,484,314	3,747	5,622	7,459	5,622 (1:264)
Munthanna	568,020	1,310	1,959	2,854	1,959 (1:290)
Maysan	813,446	2,021	3,035	4,088	4,290 (1:190)
Najaf	978,178	2,896	5,259	4,915	5,259 (1:186)
Karbala	753,216	2,613	3,247	3,785	3,375 (1:223)
Babil	1,701,700	3,532	5,872	8,552	7,954 (1:214)
Quadisiya	932,350	3,667	4,019	4,685	4,019 (1:232)
Wasit	928,978	3,167	4,813	4,668	4,813 (1:193)
Baghdad	6,211,200	19,000	25,000	31,212	25,000 (1:248)
Al Anbar	1,258,700	5,071	10,070	6,325	11,330 (1:111)
Diyala	1,474,000	7,404	10,236	7,407	9,265 (1:159)
Salah Ad Din	1,113,600	4,897	7,424	5,596	5,845 (1:191)
At Tamim	922,100	4,413	8,866	4,634	5,525 (1:167)
Sulyminayah	1,459,600	4,895	6,374	7,335	6,374 (1:229)
Ninewah	2,559,594	8,086	13,836	12,862	13,836 (1:185)
Dahuk	448,300	2,833	2,837	2,253	2,833 (1:158)
Arbil	1,181,600	4,331	4,344	5,938	4,344 (1:272)
Total	26,798,603	92,536	135,779	134,667	135,000 (1:199)

<u>Recruiting the New Iraqi Police</u>

Recruiting efforts for the Iraqi police were substantially higher than other security efforts due to the reform and high unemployment rates throughout the nation, but minimum standards were soon implemented by the CPA in an effort to build a force capable of conducting security operations. These requirements were:

1. Minimum age of 20

2. Completed secondary school with the ability to read, write, and communicate in Arabic.

3. No affiliation with the Ba'ath party in accordance with the standards enumerated in Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1.

4. No reported history of human rights violations or history of mistreatment or abuse of other persons.

5. No criminal history involving violence, theft, or violating the public trust.

6. Physically and psychologically fit to accept responsibilities.

7. Each applicant's uncorrected vision must not exceed 20/200 in either eye with normal color vision (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 19).

U.S. and Coalition forces, working through their Major Subordinate Commands, were in charge of the recruiting efforts to meet the required strength within each of the provinces. CPATT became responsible for developing the training institutions throughout the country and equipping the forces upon graduation from the academies. Initially, two main academies were developed. The main police academy for the nation of Iraq was refurbished in Baghdad and located by the Ministry of Interior's National Headquarters. A subsequent academy was built in Amman, Jordan and named the Jordan International

Police Training Center (JIPTC) where international police trainers that were restricted by their participating coalition governments to enter into Iraq lived and trained the new Iraqi police recruits. Both academies could logistically support a total of up to 1,500 police recruits for training. Soon thereafter, MNSTC-I and CPATT staff officers implemented a plan to develop regional academies throughout the nation with oversight by Major Subordinate military commands and increased the total monthly training capacity to an estimated 4,500 students. These academies were constructed in Mosul, Kirkuk, Al Asad, Sulaymaniyah, Basrah, Hillah, and Al Kut (Fil 2005a). Previously discussed ethnic and sectarian strife led to infiltration of militia and insurgent forces into the system as MSCs relied on local tribal and political leaders to provide recruits for each of the academies. As the MOI's capacity continued to develop, the plan was to transition recruiting efforts to the Ministry of Interior to supervise the process. Thus, vetting procedures of police recruits were implemented to prevent potential militia uprisings within the provinces (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 22).

Vetting New Iraqi Police Forces

There are varying reports that the vetting process of police recruits was disrupted largely due to the coalition's inaccessibility to personnel or police records throughout the recruiting process. Communications, cultural differences, and minimal background checks by major subordinate commands hampered efforts to place legitimately qualified recruits into the institutional system to prevent future ethnic strife. The U.S. Departments of Defense and State's Inspector General Assessment Team's visit recommended that "Coalition authorities should assess the extent and quality of Ministry of Interior's records relevant to the vetting process, and then conclude a non-binding memorandum of

agreement with the Ministry on access to and utilization of such material" (Krongard and Schmitz 2005, 23). The MOI's Crime Bureau Database of an estimated 700,000 fingerprint cards and identification system survived the invasion of Iraq's looting and became the primary source of the recruit vetting process. MNSTC-I and CPATT formally implemented the vetting process in January 2005 through a fragmentary order signed by the Multinational Force- Iraq (MNF-I) commander, Gen George Casey. These efforts were also reported to the U.S. House and Senate Armed Service Committees and formally briefed to visiting congressional delegates during their visits to Iraq (Petraeus 2004a). Recruiting and vetting efforts continued as MNSTC-I and MNF-I continued to train Iraqi Police forces to transition to local, provincial, and national control. The glidepath of training such forces as institutions and capabilities developed estimated that 135,000 Iraqi Police forces would be trained and equipped by February 2007 (Petraeus 2004b). As of 15 December 2005, an estimated 87,600 Iraqi Police forces had been trained in an effort to secure the nation and transition security responsibility to the nation of Iraq (Cordesman 2006a and Department of Defense 2006a). As the forces were continuing to be trained and equipped to provide security for the upcoming 15 December elections and transition control to the MOI, there were multiple voids within the Ministry's capacity and capability to control them. This problem became the responsibility of CPATT to develop the Ministry to support the Iraqi Police.

Organization of the Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior encompasses approximately 270,000 forces responsible for securing the nation of Iraq (Petraeus 2004a). The capability of the Ministry to govern a large body of forces was largely depleted after the Saddam regime and integration of

the Iraqi interim government. Little consideration was taken along political, ethnic, and

tribal affiliations to develop capacity within the organization to prevent another factional

dominance. MOI Bayan Jabr, as mentioned in Chapter 2 of the SCIRI party, was selected

to serve as the ministry's leader. He was charged with administratively and operationally

controlling the organization in figure 2.

Iraqi Security Forces

Figure 2.   MNSTC-I Brief, 15 December 2004
Source: COL Chris King, MNSTC-I J-5, Baghdad, Iraq, 13 June 2005.

Realizing the importance of the nation's security to reconstruction and

democratization, LTG Petraeus and MG Fil advised the Minister on the need to develop

the organizational capability to govern the large body of forces. With Iraqi police services

at the forefront of the organization, MG Fil and senior State Department advisor Steve

Casteel met daily with Jabr to discuss selection and retention of leaders capable of

building such capacity. In April 2005, MOI Jabr selected Major General Ali Ghaleb to

serve as a Deputy Minister of Interior and National Police Chief in order to develop the

organization (Brooks 2005). Ghaleb immediately began to develop a national capability

and traveled with MG Fil throughout the nation in order to select regional police chiefs to

govern their areas of responsibility in administration and operations. Ghaleb nominated

regional leaders that were personally interviewed by the Minister of Interior in Baghdad

before accepting them into the Ministry's organization. The police chiefs were selected

based along ethnic and sectarian lines within their respective regions and military

experience in order to command the police throughout the ongoing insurgency. LTG

Petraeus, MG Fil, and Steve Casteel continued to advise the Minister on additional billets

within the ministry that were necessary to effectively secure the nation and the Bayan

Jabr briefed the reorganization of the ministry in figure 3 to European Union

representatives on 11 June 2005.

Figure 3.   MOI Brief to the European Union, 11 June 2005
Source: Deputy Senior Advisor to the Iraqi MOI, Matt Sherman, 10 June 2005.

Deputy Minister of Interior and National Police Chief Ghaleb developed five regional police chiefs in charge of their respective provinces. The decentralization of such command allows national oversight of each of the regions and facilitates the state's authority to govern security operations. As Iraqi police forces are recruited, vetted, trained, and equipped to enforce the rule of law, they return to local police stations and report to an established chain of command. This organization was developed in order to avoid civil and ethnic strife among religious, tribal, and political leaders throughout the nation (Brooks 2005). As administrative and operational capability developed at the national level, CPATT staff continued to develop a strategy to transition security operations at the regional, provincial, and police headquarters.

<u>Police Partnership Efforts</u>

Performance of the Iraqi Police Service can be evaluated from the viewpoint of the Iraqi people and the assessment of coalition military/ diplomatic experts and/or Iraqi politicians. Results of a poll taken in March 2004 indicated that "the Iraqi police received the most positive rating of the seven government institutions surveyed: 79 percent of the Iraqis gave the police a positive rating" (Cordesman 2005a, 21). It is important to consider such polls to obtain the opinion of the population. However, one must conclude that such polls will vary based on the continuing volatile environment that contains such complex security problems. It is also significant to make an accurate assessment of the police when building capacities for a new Iraqi democratic government that will be formed after the elections of 15 December 2005. These efforts will require a delicate balance in order to successfully avoid civil and ethnic strife pending the outcome of the first democratic national election Iraq has experienced. Such efforts require the support of

the coalition military and diplomatic efforts to insure the police forces transition in an acceptable manner that they will be unhindered by political agendas.

CPATT and MNSTC-I developed a strategy to facilitate the transition of police forces to gradually assume local, provincial, regional, and national control based on guidance from Defense and State Department officials in May 2005. In June 2005, a Police Partnership Program was developed by CPATT staff that incorporated military and civilian officials at every level of police headquarters and was designed to mentor and advise the officers in all aspects of policing (Watters 2005). Responsibilities of the teams include:

1. Policy and Liaison

2. Civilian Police advice

3. Ops Planning and execution

4. Personnel, discipline and pay

5. Logistics, finance, and contracts

6. Counterinsurgency and Special and Police Liaison

7. Intelligence security

8. Communications and Information Technology

9. Training

10. Interpreters (x2) and translator

The intent of the program is to continue to build the capability of the police in respect to each of the above areas at all levels and standardize the internal security organization without regard to the outcome of upcoming and future elections. These billets were approved by the U.S Departments of State and Defense and initially filled

with Major Subordinate command military personnel and CPATT Civilian contractor support. In an effort to relive Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) of the additional task, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a request by MNSTC-I to fill the military billets within the program from additional military forces within the Department of Defense. In order to effectively standardize the partnership system, MNSTC-I and CPATT staff developed metrics that subjectively assessed their partner in order to allow U.S. and coalition forces to conduct the transition to an Iraqi controlled security apparatus.

Transition Readiness Assessments

Police Transition Teams were required to subjectively assess at every level of the Iraqi Police Services from local police through national headquarters beginning in June 2005 (Fil 2005b). The initial assessments were required by the Commander of MNF-I in order to obtain an assessment of police forces throughout the nation and determine the required U.S. and coalition troop strength throughout the nation. The assessments examined the following areas:

1. Personnel

2. Training

3. Equipment

4. Force Protection

5. Facilities Infrastructure

6. Station Effectiveness

7. Leadership

8. District Budget

9. Insurgent and Criminal Activity

Reports were submitted at station levels and consolidated at district, provincial, and regional levels to allow the MNF-I and MNSTC-I commanders to make an accurate assessment of the effectives of police forces within each major subordinate command's area of responsibility. These reports mirrored the Iraqi Army assessments in MNSTC-I's efforts to build Ministry of Interior and Defense forces simultaneously to secure the nation and provide a common operational picture for military commanders. Consequently, the progress reports of each of the units allowed major subordinate commanders to make a transition readiness assessment within their areas of responsibility and transfer control of those areas to the Iraqi Security forces with the approval of the U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi leadership.

The Transition Readiness Assessment is a subjective evaluation based upon reporting requirements emplaced by MNF-I. Refer to Figure 4 on the next page.

This evaluation does not consider ethnicity or sectarian police elements, but facilitates strategic decision-making with regards to U.S. and Coalition troop strength as they transition security responsibilities to the newly elected representatives of the democratic nation of Iraq. Transitional decisions are made in partnership with Iraqi ministerial leaders and approved at strategic military and diplomatic levels. As of 15 December 2005, the Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah, and the southern predominantly Shia provinces of Muthanna, Maysan, and Dhi Qar transitioned to provincial control due to very low crime and insurgency levels (Brooks 2005). Success of the Iraqi police requires effective structures and organizations at the local through national levels and the Ministry of Interior must continue their efforts to take over this newly developed capability.

Transition Readiness Assessment

Personnel | Command/Control | Training | Sustainment | Equipping | Leadership

Iraqi Security Force Unit Capability

Level 1	**Fully Capable:** A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
Level 2	**Capable:** A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.
Level 3	**Partially Capable:** A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
Level 4	**Incapable:** A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Projection of Readiness to Assume Security Responsibility

Figure 4.   LTG Petraeus Brief, 13 June 2005
Source: MAJ Charlie Miller, Executive Assistant to CG, MNSTC-I, 10 May 2005.

<u>Summary</u>

Security and stability challenges in Iraq today resembles similar historical events the country has experienced since the end of the First World War. Insufficient numbers of US and coalition forces in the country after toppling Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party regime presented similar security challenges to those experienced by the British in 1921 and from 1958 to 1968 when multiple coups continued to plague the nation's capacity to effectively govern and provide internal security throughout the nation. The CPA's efforts to reform Iraq's Police service instead of completely dissolve it were a feeble attempt to fill a security vacuum when the army was dissolved. This became

effectively difficult given the ethnic, religious, tribal, and political differences, coupled with high unemployment rates as the country began its quest to sovereignty. Radical militias associated with political and religious figures continued to plague stability and reconstruction throughout the nation.

The inclusion of former militia, low-ranking military personnel, and former police into the reformed Iraqi police service proved to be a very feasible option, provided they were properly recruited and vetted to prevent uprisings within each of the provinces. Attempts to overcome ethnic differences by including them into the newly formed government continue to improve as strategies change. Historically-oppressed Shiites, autonomy-seeking Kurds, and the historically powerful Sunni Arabs must be included in an equitable share of governmental positions, despite their desired agendas.

The ongoing efforts to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Interior have been successful thus far. Security throughout the nation would have been quicker and more efficient pending the following variables:

Initial reliance on tribal, religious, and ethnic leaders to police their areas led to a series of militias rather than a centralized internal security infrastructure. Sunni Arab resistance to democratization, Shia Arab efforts to include religion in government, and Kurdish desires for autonomy hindered efforts to develop a centralized police force for the entire nation.

Recruiting efforts by MSCs without the necessary cultural intelligence of their assigned areas of responsibility led to infiltration of police forces by insurgents and others in an effort to disrupt U.S. and coalition attempts to reform the Iraqi Police.

Ineffective vetting procedures for entry into the police institutions also led to infiltration and, at times, employment of former criminal groups throughout the nation.

Ineffective capacity to administratively or operationally govern police forces initially led to an unsynchronized effort to train and equip Iraqi Police forces. This problem was eventually mitigated by the creation of MNSTC-I and CPATT and the assignment of a national police chief to build the capabilities throughout the nation.

The strategy to transition security responsibilities to the nation of Iraq was initially stymied by incorrect intelligence estimates of local, provincial, regional, and national capabilities of Ministry of Interior forces. Despite such errors, adjustments to the transition strategy through ministerial and force structure reorganization, police partnership, and transitional readiness assessments continue to play a vital role in the ability of the MOI to effectively govern numerous forces.

Consequently, the U.S. and its coalition partners will continue to train, equip, and advise the Ministry of Interior and its police forces well beyond the elections of 15 December 2005 in an effort to build the force structure and organization required to police the newly formed democracy governing a body of 26 million people. The new government will be reliant on their strategy and advice until such a time when newly elected leaders no longer require their assistance. This will require not only the support of the US led coalition, but will also require assistance from the international community. The European Union, NATO and others must be prepared to assist in the efforts in order to prevent another authoritarian regime like that of Saddam Hussein. The final chapter will make conclusions and recommendations on the research conducted to answer the original thesis question.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Operation Iraqi Freedom presented several options for the US led coalition for Iraq's stability and reconstruction efforts after the culmination of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime. The Coalition Provisional Authority that immediately governed the nation until their transfer of sovereignty on 28 June 2004. They removed the leadership with its high level staff and exploited the rest of the state structure for the establishment of a new order and stability and attempted to transform the nation of Iraq under the administration of the United States (Dodge 2003, viii-xii).

In doing so, the CPA issued Order Number Two, which de-Ba'athified Iraq and the preponderance of its police senior leadership. The new Iraqi government's capacity and capability to effectively govern the new sovereign nation did not exist and security conditions continued to deteriorate throughout the country. Consequently, the coalition relied on its combat forces still in theater to conduct security and stability operations. These forces faced a growing, complex insurgency resulting from high unemployment rates, militia forces supporting religious, tribal, and ethnic factions and a multitude of other difficulties. Coalition leaders, in partnership with the Iraqi interim and transitional governments continued to develop a functional governmental body, write a permanent constitution for the nation, and conduct stability and reconstruction operations simultaneously. In order to perform these operations, security remained as the center of gravity. Therefore, the development and construction of the national security was likely the most important institutional requirement amid the rising insurgency and growing ethnic and sectarian tensions.

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This thesis claims the Ministry of Interior is currently the most important institution involved in stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq. However, historical implications show the use of this governmental body to further political and religious agendas requires continuous oversight and balance to avoid another authoritarian regime. Therefore, policymakers and constitutional writers play a vital role in the development of a national capability to enforce the rule of law as part of a democratic state.

<div align="center">Findings and Analysis Summary</div>

The ethnic and sectarian demographics of Iraq pose one of the greatest challenges to security and stability for the nation. Although civil war has not erupted throughout the history of the nation, the current conditions amplify its potential. As Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish religious and political leaders draft a new constitution for a unified nation, profound differences in beliefs will continue to surface. Therefore, it requires support from the U.S. led coalition and the international community to compromise on a common form of democracy.

The historical period of Iraq since the First World War portrays the ability of such ethnic and spiritual leaders to instill political agendas on the Iraqi populace through the use of security services and militias. Sunni Arabs, since the Iraqi Monarchy of 1921 used violence as their security apparatuses to enforce political mandates. Consequently, the Ministry of Interior requires careful scrutiny in its development and use in order to prevent another potential Saddam Hussein regime. The police services must be built upon the foundation to enforce the rule of law and not to enforce the desires of political, tribal, and spiritual leaders. Additionally, these forces must support the people and constitution

of the nation and not allow leaders to influence them in enforcing agendas as history indicates.

Militias continue to plague the nation's security and stability through democratization. The CPA and Iraqi interim government's attempt to dissolve them was unsuccessful as political parties continue to use them with violence to promote agendas. Therefore, the fundamental task of the Iraqi government and the international community remains to integrate these forces into the national internal security plan and use them to support and defend the constitution without ethnic and sectarian ties. Organizations that cannot be reformed must be treated as insurgents and dealt with accordingly. Individual reform of these elements is mandatory, while using these units to quell insurgent uprisings and terrorist attempts to derail the democratic process.

The potential for civil strife continues for other reasons as well. Kurdish desires for autonomy revolve around the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The economic benefits of this resource will allow them to establish an independent Kurdistan that has no ties with the national government of Iraq. This issue must remain at the forefront of negotiations with the Iraqi Government as part of the unification of Kurdish people into the new Iraq. Kurdish leaders and Peshmerga forces play a vital role in the internal security for the nation and must be included in the national security plan to achieve stability and security. Leaders must develop a delicate balance of police forces in ethnically diverse cities such as Kirkuk and Baghdad among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis in an effort to undermine potential flashpoints.

Radical uprisings by clerics like Moqtada al-Sadr continue to hamper the security process. Ministry officials and the international Arab community must condemn these

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events from occurring and convince them to become a part of the political process. Sunni Arab militant organizations also continue to hamper such efforts as their loss of dominant political power since the First World War provokes fear among their people of a Shia and Kurdish dominated government. Diplomats must also address their leaders and convince them to become a part of the process. The Kurdish Peshmerga, Badr Organization, and former Sunni Arab police must receive individual training from the U.S. led coalition and become involved in the administrative and operational control at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels. Again, this process requires constant oversight in an effort to integrate personnel of such diverse ethnic and sectarian ties throughout the training process.

The Ministry of Interior must develop the capacity to recruit and vet Iraqi police forces at all levels. This capability will require cooperation with tribal and religious leaders, access to international criminal database records, and regional oversight from a neutral viewpoint. These efforts must also receive the Prime Minister's and Minister of Interior's support to prevent the infiltration of insurgent and terrorist organizations into the police force that could potentially inflict harm on the organization and population upon completion of training.

The Ministry of Interior must also develop the capacity to provide administrative and operational control of an overwhelmingly large organization. As the Ministry of Defense grows its new Iraqi Army, close coordination with military units will strengthen the internal security of the nation and prevent potential ethnic and sectarian clashes. The newly-elected permanent government must establish and enforce policies and constitutional by-laws to prevent local and provincial militias from forming and

interfering in the nation's security plan and maintain constant oversight of them at the regional and national level. Databases must be built to provide accurate personnel and training records in efforts to sustain a newly developed force structure. Coordination with the U.S. led coalition will also be of utmost importance as police forces conduct operations within MSC areas of responsibility. Additionally, as police partnership and transition efforts continue, police chiefs and transition teams at all levels must maintain continuous contact as these areas are returned to the Iraqi security services.

Recommendations

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of Ministry of Interior Forces, specifically the Iraqi Police Services, after U.S. and coalition forces depart. These forces will continue their effectiveness if the following recommendations are incorporated as part of their transition to secure the nation. In considering the analysis, I will provide recommendations from a historical perspective that will focus on the ongoing force structure development, reorganization, recruiting and vetting process, and partnership and transition efforts.

Integration of Individuals into Police Units and Stations

As of 15 December 2005, some 87,000 police forces received initial basic training to police the nation in a counterinsurgency environment (Cordesman 2006a and Department of Defense 2006a). These trained individuals have since become integrated into police units. In order for these forces to continue developing, they must successfully integrate individuals into units and become team players to support and defend the constitution of the people, not the political agenda. This will require discipline and strong

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leadership from nominally selected police leadership at all levels. The required endstate

of 135,000 is only an estimate and will require adjustments as the security situation

changes throughout the nation. Many of the Ministry of Interior's ancillary units

mentioned in Chapter 2 will not be necessary as the insurgency subsides. These forces

must be integrated into the Iraqi Police Services force structure and trained accordingly.

Consequently, this integration will require meticulous administrative changes to manage

the transition as these forces return to the police stations in their provinces. Modifications

to academy curriculum will also require additional training to enforce the rule of law

when most of these forces were previously trained to fight an insurgency. Continuing

education programs will be vital to sustaining the initial training programs the MNSTC-I

and CPATT personnel started. These programs should be required in order to progress

throughout the police forces. A highly educated and trained officer corps must be able to

continue to provide guidance and direction for the training and education of the police at

all levels. These forces must continue to protect and serve the entire people of Iraq

without regard to their ethnic and sectarian ties.

Reorganization of the National Ministerial Leadership

The reorganization of the Interior Ministry's Iraqi Police Service into regional

areas is a positive step that will provide oversight to avoid potential militant uprisings and

equality among the diverse ethnicities. However, there are a few potential developments

that could further reduce the risk of chaos and civil war. The addition of deputy ministers

of interior from the other dominant ethnicities would provide equal representation and

inclusion into the nation's interior security organization. For example, if the selected

Minister of Interior is a Shia Arab, the deputy ministers are Sunni Arab and Kurdish

senior police officers. The ethnic geography does not support this theory at regional and provincial levels, but provides national oversight and liaison with the regions to prevent future uprisings.

Recruiting and Vetting Responsibilities

The recruiting and vetting process of Iraqi Police Forces must become the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, not the U.S. led coalition. The addition of deputy ministers would also facilitate the process of insuring the recruits are qualified to serve the nation as part of an effort to provide security and stability and not to protect tribal and political values. Recruiting stations in each of the provinces, similar to the U.S. military recruiting stations would be responsible for completing the necessary prerequisites for each candidate prior to their entry into the police academies. Again, the vetting process will require regional oversight by the nominally selected regional police chiefs and endorsement by the national headquarters in Baghdad.

Police Partnership and Transition Efforts

Police transition teams and their associated transition metrics will continue to be of vital importance to secure the nation of Iraq. As the Iraqi police services assume control of areas from the Iraqi Army, U.S. and coalition requirements will decrease. The police forces must be competent in the areas the transition teams assess and the provincial, regional, and national headquarters must continue to develop their capacity to sustain operations. Additional emphasis must be placed on administration, logistics, and personnel as the military's transition teams often lack the experience required to develop such specialty areas. European Union and NATO participation in those fields cannot only

influence the effectiveness of the police forces, but also bolster the international community's perception of the legitimacy of Iraq's government.

GEN George Casey has declared 2006 as "The Year of the Police in Iraq." The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has taken the initial steps to become effective when the U.S. led coalition departs and Iraq develops its national identity. The assistance of the international community and their associated organizations is paramount to prevent another authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Political and military interaction with Iraq must continue in order to unify such an ethnically diverse nation in the midst of an extremely complex insurgency. If the Iraqi Minister of Interior and Iraqi police Service continues their ongoing efforts to provide security to the entire nation, democracy will prevail in the nation of Iraq.

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